The inability of a simple real business cycle model to predict a rise in consumption in response to increased government spending in order to reconcile empirical evidence, has stimulated the development of alternative models, which have all been used to evaluate the effects of government spending shocks. We quantitatively investigate various transmission mechanisms for government spending shocks proposed in the literature and use a Bayesian approach to identify the one that fits the data best. We find that the mechanism featuring deep habit formation outperforms all others considered, while the mechanism relying on non-Ricardian "rule-of-thumb" consumers provides the poorest fit.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a rising interest in modeling government spending and its effects on the economy. This growing research has resulted in a variety of models with government spending shocks, however the question remains as to which model is most appropriate for the analysis. In this paper, within a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) environment, we quantitatively investigate the several propagation mechanisms for government spending shocks proposed in the literature.
All the models we include in this investigation were developed in an attempt to resolve the inconsistency between empirical and theoretical literature predictions about the co-movement between public and private expenditures conditional on a government spending shock. The response of consumption to a government spending shock is subject to a lively debate in the literature, and of great importance in studying the stimulative effects of increased government spending. While many empirical studies, using various methods of identifying government spending shocks, find evidence of a government spending increase boosting private consumption (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Fatas and Mihov (2001) , Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Fisher and Peters (2010) ), most theoretical models fail to generate this positive correlation between private and public consumption.
1 The main reason that traditional business cycle models fail to explain the rise in consumption in response to a government spending shock is that an increase in government spending generates a dominating negative wealth effect on consumers, which inevitably leads to a fall in private consumption. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006) note that positive correlation between government spending and private consumption can be achieved if firm markups of prices over marginal costs are counter-cyclical with the economic activity. In this situation, since rising government spending results in an expansion of aggregate demand, the markups fall and as a consequence, the labor demand rises. With the sufficient expansion of the labor demand, and hours in equilibrium, wages may consequently go up to ensure a rise in consumption. Countercyclical movements in markups can generally be achieved by introducing price stickiness. However, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) demonstrate that price stickiness alone is not sufficient to predict a rise in consumption in response to increasing government expenditures. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006) use the notion of "deep habits" in preferences for consumption to generate endogenous countercyclical markups. The notion of deep habits applies when consumers form habits at individual varieties of goods, rather than at the ag-gregate level, as is the case in more standard models of "superficial" habit formation. They show that the deep habits mechanism allows to generate large enough movements in markups to guarantee a rise in consumption even in the absence of price stickiness.
An alternative way to model positive correlation between public and private consumption is offered by Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Vallés (2007) . They introduce households who do not make optimizing decisions, and may therefore increase consumption in response to a rise in government spending. Following the so-called "rule-of-thumb", these households consume their entire disposable income in each period. If an increase in consumption of the rule-ofthumb consumers is large enough in equilibrium, the aggregate consumption may increase after rising government spending.
Besides deep habit formation and rule-of-thumb households, other modifications of a standard RBC framework have been used to resolve the problem of co-movement between private and public consumption. Firstly, Linnemann and Schabert (2004) and Bouakez and Rebei (2007) consider an environment where the household directly benefits from government spending through increased utility. They show that if the elasticity of substitution between public and private spending is sufficiently low, then an increase in government spending raises the marginal utility of consumption, making private consumption more attractive for households. If this effect dominates the negative wealth effect of public spending, the positive correlation of private and public consumption may be observed in response to a public spending shock. Ganelli and Tervala (2009) make the same statement in a model where public and private consumption are complements.
Secondly, Baxter and King (1993) , Ambler and Paquet (1996) , and Linnemann and Schabert (2006) model government spending as enhancing productivity of firms. When higher government spending rises productivity, it increases the scale of production and as a result consumer welfare, which provides a possibility for consumption to rise in response to higher government spending. Linnemann and Schabert (2006) show that even if the impact of government expenditures on production is small, government expenditures can cause a rise in private consumption if the government share is not too large and public finance does not solely rely on distortionary taxation.
Lastly, Linnemann (2006) , Monacelli and Perotti (2008) claim that the positive effect of government spending on consumption may be obtained by choosing a specific form of the utility function. In particular, using a simple real business cycle framework, Linnemann (2006) demonstrates that the necessary requirement for the positive consumption response to the government spending shock is a non-separable utility and complementarity between consumption and leisure. At the same time, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) emphasize that the wealth effect on labor supply is important in determining the effect of government spending on consumption. For utility functions where the wealth effect on labor supply is absent, using the DSGE setting with nominal rigidities, they show that consumption increases responding to the government spending shock, while a drop in consumption is observed in a model where the wealth effect on labor supply is large.
In this paper, the focus is on quantitative comparison of five models -the deep habits model, the model with rule-of-thumb consumers, the model where government spending influences individual preferences directly, the model with productive government expenditures, and finally the baseline model that does not rely on any of these mechanisms. For the baseline model, we adopt a non-separable utility function to allow for the possibility of either a positive or negative response of consumption to the government spending shock. To make all models comparable, we use the same utility specification in the other four models, and then check the robustness of our results to the choice of preferences by incorporating a separable utility function. While models incorporating these distinct mechanisms have been estimated in separate studies, 2 they usually have variations in model assumptions and data sets, which makes it difficult or impossible to compare the models and their transmission mechanisms.
For proper model comparison, we embed the transmission mechanisms into identical frameworks, and estimate them using identical data sets and prior distributions for all common parameters in the models. In order to evaluate the relative quantitative performance of these models, we compare their marginal likelihoods, and calculate Bayes factors to identify which model fits the data best.
We find that the model with deep habits outperforms other models, while the model featuring rule-of-thumb consumers provides the poorest fit of the data. We show that all estimated model can generate a positive response of consumption to the government spending shock, though the magnitude and statistical significance of this response varies across the different specifications. At the same time, the output effect of the government spending shock is surprisingly consistent across the estimated models.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the general framework and model specifics in Section 2. Section 4 offers the strategy for estimation and model analysis. Section 5 discusses estimation results and robustness of our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Models of Government Spending
All the models we consider have some common features, among which are capital adjustment costs, and variable depreciation. We assume consumption habits for all models, although exact specification may be different across models. The role of monetary policy is motivated by nominal price and wage rigidities, while monetary policy is described by a standard Taylor-type rule. There are four sources of uncertainty in addition to the government spending shock. They are the neutral and investment specific shocks, preference shock, and monetary policy shock. We model the economy as evolving along the balanced growth path, with the long-run trend for consumption, output, wages different from the long-run trend in capital and investment.
The specific models of government spending extend this set up in the following way: the first model incorporates deep habit formation over consumption of private and public goods. The second model introduces a share of the households being rule-of-thumb consumers. The other two models assume that government spending enhances the production technology and household utility function, respectively. Finally, the baseline model does not have any of these specific features, however, the positive response of consumption is possible because of non-separable household utility function between consumption and leisure.
Main Framework
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households. Each household participates in the following activities. It consumes, supplies differentiated labor services to the labor packer, accumulates capital by means of investing, rents capital to firms, pays taxes and receives dividends from ownership in firms.
Households.
Every household supplies a differentiated labor service to a labor packer to be aggregated according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregating technology:
where η w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across different types of labor, and the upper script j helps to distinguish between different types of labor. The homogenous labor h t is then supplied to firms at a real rate W t . Households posses monopolistic power over their wages, and have the ability to set the labor specific wage rate; however, they are required 4 to satisfy the demand for labor at this wage rate. Changes in the wage rate are associated with the cost, which is determined as
per dollar of the wage bill. In this formula, α w > 0 is the wage adjustment cost parameter, W j t is the individual real wage rate, π t and π are the inflation rate at a date t and along the balance growth path, respectively, and µ z * is the rate of growth of the economy (output, consumption, and wages) along the balances growth path.
The households own physical capital, K t . Capital is accumulated through the process of investing. Following Fisher (2003) , investment goods I t are obtained from consumption using a stochastic linear technology, according to which at each date t, one unit of consumption can produce Υ t units of investment. We call Υ t the investment specific technology. Denoting µ Υ,t ≡ Υ t /Υ t−1 , the gross growth rate of Υ t , the dynamics for the growth rate of the investment specific technology is
where
, with σ Υ > 0, and µ Υ is the growth rate of the investment specific technology along the balanced growth path.
Capital u t K t , where u t determines the intensity of capital utilization, is rented out to firms at a real rental rate R k t . Adjusting the stock of capital is costly for households, and the cost per unit of capital is
where κ > 0, and µ I is the steady-state growth rate of capital and investment. This form of capital adjustment costs is derived from Ireland (2003) . Capital depreciates at a variable rate depending on how intensively it is used. Therefore, the dynamics of capital is:
where δ(u t ) is the depreciation function, parameterized as follows:
where δ 0 , δ 1 , δ 2 ≥ 0, and u is the steady state rate of capital utilization. Households are required to pay lump-sum taxes in the amount T t in terms of consumption. The exact tax structure is model specific and is described in details in Section 2.2. Households own shares in firms, and receive dividends with the real value Φ t . Complete set of one-period state-contingent assets, as well as the risk-free government bonds are traded in financial markets. If households have access to financial markets, 3 then the budget constraint can be written as
where L t is the payoff in period t of state-contingent securities traded in period t − 1, r t,t+1 is the price of a state contingent security traded at date t for a claim on consumption delivered in period t + 1, C t is real consumption, and B t is the real value of government bonds in possession of households. The new bonds are purchased at a price 1/R t . Each household derives utility from a consumption measure X t , the exact definition of which differs across the three models, and differentiated labor h t . The life-time expected utility of households is defined as
where E 0 denotes expectations based on period zero information set, β is the discount factor, and d t is the preference shock, evolving according to an AR(1) process:
where 0 < ρ d < 1, and ϵ
The intratemporal utility function is nonseparable in leisure and consumption and consistent with long-run balanced growth:
where the inverse of σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ζ > 0 . 
where a t is the demand for the firm's output, Ω(·) is the cost of price changes, following Rotemberg (1982) . We assume that this cost is quadratic and proportional to the stochastic trend Z * t :
with α p > 0. Monopolistically competitive firms must satisfy their demands at the posted price.
Fiscal and monetary policy
The fiscal authority levies taxes, and develops public projects with real cost of G t . To ensure the model has a well-defined balanced growth path, we assume that government expenditures evolve along the same stochastic trend as output and consumptions. The 7 detrended government expenditures, g t = Gt Z * t evolve exogenously according to the AR(1) process
where 0 < ρ g < 1 , and ϵ
In this paper we rely on lump-sum taxation to finance government spending, and abstract from distortionary taxes.
5 This is in order to keep the focus on the transmission of government spending shocks. It has been widely acknowledged that monetary policy is important for the effect of government spending shocks. We assume that monetary policy is described by a generalized Taylor type rule with the interest rate smoothing and response to inflation and output growth, as follows:
where 
Model Specific Features
In this Section, we briefly describe the four models we consider in light of the specific features. More details on the models, including the first order and market clearing conditions, are given in the Appendix.
Model with Deep Habits
We adopt the "fully-fledged" version of the deep habits model from Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006) , and define X t in Equation (3) as
where index i refers to a variety of differentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms, η p > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, b c is the habit formation parameter for private consumption, and S i,t is the good-specific stock of habit, which evolves over time according to the law of motion, 
where b g is the habits parameter for public goods, and the stock of habits S g i,t is determined as follows S
where 0 ≤ ρ gg ≤ 1. Taxation is non-distorting in the sense that households pay the lump-sum tax T t in the amount that keeps the government budget balanced in each period. Parameter q t of the production function in Equation (4) is set to 1.
Model with Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
As in Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Vallés (2007) , we assume that only a fraction (1 − λ) of all households have access to capital markets where they can trade state-contingent bonds and accumulate capital to rent out to firms. These are known as optimizing households. Other households, the so-called rule-of-thumb consumers, do not participate in financial markets, therefore they cannot borrow or save. These households are restricted to consume out of their disposable labor income.
Utility of optimizing households is determined by Equation (3), where X t is the habit adjusted consumption,
in which b c is the consumption habits parameter and C o t denotes homogenous consumption of optimizing households at date t. The homogenous consumption is the aggregate of differentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology: In a symmetric equilibrium, the rule-of-thumb households providing differentiated labor services, the wage rates for both types of households coincide, thus
Consumption of the rule-of-thumb households is determined by their disposable income, which is determined after wage cost adjustment as follows:
In this formula, T r t is the tax burden of a rule-of-thumb households. We assume that the detrended tax paid by the rule of thumb consumers is constant, so that
r . We assume that, on the other hand, taxes of optimizing households are set to keep the government budget balanced. Finally, parameter q t ≡ 1 in Equation (4).
Model with Government Spending in the Utility Function
We follow Bouakez and Rebei (2007) and define X t in the intratemporal utility in Equation (3) as habit adjusted effective consumption,
where b c > 0 is the habit formation parameter, and the effective consumptionC t is the combination of private and public consumption, C t and G t :
where 0 < ϕ < 1, and ν > 0. Here, ν is the elasticity of substitution between private and public spending. When ν = 0, private and public consumption are perfect complements and they become substitutes for ν → ∞. The homogenous consumption is the aggregate of differentiated goods produced by mo-nopolistically competitive firms using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology:
where η p is the elasticity of substitution between individual good varieties, and Y i t is differentiated output of firms.
We assume taxation is non-distorting, and households pay the lump-sum tax in the amount that keeps the government budget balanced in each period. Parameter q t ≡ 1 in the production function defined in Equation (4).
Model with Productive Government Spending and the Baseline Model
The only difference between the las two models is that in the baseline model, q t ≡ 1 in Formula (4). while in the model with productive government spending, we acknowledge that government actions may directly affect the production processes. Similar to Baxter and King (1993) , public spending enhances the production technology in Equation (4) through q t . We assume that detrended real government spending affects q t in the following way
where α G > 0, gives the share of government spending in the production function. Utility in both models features standard superficial habit in consumption, therefore X t in Formula (3) is defined as
where b c is the consumption habit parameter, and C t is the homogenous consumption which is the aggregate of differentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology:
Again, we assume taxation is non-distorting as in the deep habits model. Households pay the lump-sum tax amount that keeps the government budget balanced in each period.
Propagation Mechanisms of the Government Spending Shock
According to a standard real business cycle (RBC) model, the government spending shock reduces resources of the economy generating a negative wealth effect. As a result, consumption falls, while output and labor increase. While it is widely accepted that a rise in government spending stimulates production and employment, its negative effect on consumption is puzzling in light of the majority of empirical evidence. Bilbiie (2009) demonstrates that in a simple RBC framework, there is no possibility for consumption to rise in response to rising government spending, unless the labor supply function is negatively sloped. This can be verified graphically using Figure 1 , which shows the equilibrium in the market for labor services. In the figure, the real wage rate w is plotted along the vertical, and labor hours h -along the horizontal axis. The solid bold line in the figure represents the supply of labor before the shock, while the bold starred line is the labor demand of firms. The supply of labor is determined by
The labor demand is given by
where mc is the real marginal cost of firms, which is the inverse of firm's price markup over the marginal costs. In the standard RBC framework, mc, and u equal 1 at all times and in all states of the economy. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
, is usually increasing both in consumption and labor. This property ensures that the labor supply is positively sloped, and a drop in consumption increases the labor supply, while an increase in consumption shifts the labor supply to the left.
In a standard RBC model, a rise in government spending is associated with the negative wealth effect, and thus reduces consumption and increases the labor supply. Note from Equation (8) that labor supply increases because when consumption drops, the same real wage rate is associated with larger supply of labor. Therefore, the equilibrium moves instantaneously from point 0 to 1 in Figure 1 . If an equilibrium increase in consumption were a possibility in this model, this would cause labor supply decrease according to Equation (8) , with the new equilibrium at point 2. However, this scenario is impossible in the most standard version of the model, because with reduced equilibrium labor, output would shrink leaving no possibility for consumption to expand. Therefore, the necessary condition for consumption to rise is that the new equilibrium supports larger employment, allowing output to expand. This possibility would arise in a model where labor demand increases endogenously due to rising government spending. This scenario is shown by point 3 in Figure  1 . At this point labor is larger than that at point 0 and consumption increased, which means that equilibrium might be supported at this point.
The introduction of imperfectly competitive goods market and price stickiness allow the labor demand to increase in the model. With price stickiness, an increase in output demand due to the rising government spending is associated with larger marginal costs and increased labor demand, since firms can not easily adjust prices. Because the marginal cost is the inverse of the firm's markup, then mc and output move pro-cyclically.
Price stickiness, however turns out to be unsuccessful in generating sufficient shifts in the labor demand curve to guarantee a rise in consumption in response to government spending shock, as shown by Linnemann and Schabert (2003) . Therefore, additional assumptions are needed to overturn the negative wealth effect on consumption. In the model with rule of thumb consumers, this is done by introducing a fraction of non-Ricardian consumers who consume their entire disposable income in every period, following the so called "rule of thumb", or because they have no access to the financial market. Because optimizing households still experience a drop in wealth due to a rise in public spending, the rise in total consumption can only be achieved if either rule-of-thumb households increase consumption substantially, or the wage rate of optimizing households rises enough to override the negative wealth effect of a government spending shock. The wage income rises if the wage rate or hours worked increase. Because optimizing agents demand to work more, the wage rate tends to drop. Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Vallés (2007) assume price stickiness so that firms increase labor demand when faced with increased demand so that wages may potentially rise. In addition, they rely on an important assumption that labor markets are non-competitive in such a way that both types of households always work the same hours. This assumption guarantees that the labor of rule-of-thumb households increases when government spending rise. The wage income of rule-of-thumb households then rises which induces them to increase consumption. Certainly, aggregate consumption in this model will only increase if the share of rule-of-thumb consumers, λ, is large enough to compensate for the drop in consumption of optimizing households.
6
The mechanism of the deep habits follows the same route as that of nominal price rigidity, because it works by generating endogenous countercyclical markups of firms. The reason is that the combination of deep habits and imperfect competition results in time-varying elasticity of demand. To see this, note that in a simplified deep habits model, the demand for consumption good i is given by,
For this demand function, its price elasticity is η p
Note that the price elasticity of demand is proportional to the habit adjusted consumption level, (C t − b c C t−1 ). Therefore, when aggregate demand rises, the price elasticity of demand increases, and everything else equal, producers have incentives to reduce markups. By doing so, firms gain a larger share of the market to form the stock of habits and increase future profits.
9 The resulting drop in markups raises the real marginal cost mc, and therefore increases the labor demand curve in the same way as in the mechanism with sticky prices. However, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2007) show that deep habits generate much larger movements in the markups and consequently labor demand, than price stickiness, providing a better foundation to obtain the positive response of consumption to the government spending shock. They show that the deep habits mechanism helps explain a rise in consumption even in the absence of nominal price stickiness. The similar outward shift in the demand for labor leading to the new equilibrium in point 3 occurs in the model with productive government spending. In this case, however, the labor demand curve shifts out due to a rise in productivity F h in Equation (9), rather than the marginal cost. If the effect of government spending on labor productivity is large enough, which is dictated by α G (the share of spending in the production function), the rise in consumption may be an equilibrium outcome.
Another transmission mechanism is utilized in the model where government spending directly influences utility. Linnemann and Schabert (2004) and Bouakez and Rebei (2007) notice that if private and public consumption are complements in the sense that an increase in government spending raises marginal utility of consumption, then a rise in government spending increases labor supply as shown in Figure 2 . With this move, a rise in consumption becomes a possibility, because it does not necessarily cause a reduction in labor supply, as 7 This is the simplified demand function under the assumption of ρ c = 0. Note also that in the absence of deep habits, the demand function would be, C i,t = (P it /P t ) −ηp C t , implying time-invariant price elasticity of η p .
8 A similar demand function holds for the intermediate government spending good, G it and there is similar intuition behind pro-cyclicality of price elasticity in response to increased demand from government spending.
9 This counter-cyclicality of markups has been documented in many empirical studies, such as Bils (1987) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) .
shown by the new equilibrium at point 5 in the figure.
The form and calibration of the utility function by itself plays an important role in the resulting effect of government spending shock on consumption. Linnemann (2006) claims that in the RBC setting, the necessary condition for a rise in consumption is that consumption and leisure must be substitute goods in the sense that U 12 < 0.
10 Monacelli and Perotti (2008) emphasize the importance of the wealth effect on labor supply in determining the response of consumption to the government spending shock. The idea there is that the smaller is the shift of the labor supply curve as a result of the shock, the more likely the new equilibrium will move north-east of point 0 in Figure 1 , raising both wages and hours. 11 In the example they use, consumption rises in the economy with nominal price stickiness where preferences feature no wealth effect on labor supply, and fall if preferences are such that the wealth effect on labor supply is significant. The models we estimate have additional features commonly used in the estimated DSGE models, such as nominal wage rigidities, habit formation, investment adjustment cost, and endogenous capital utilization. Adding these features complicates understanding of the propagation mechanism of the government spending shock. For example, rigid wages mitigate fluctuations in income resulting from the shock, which reduces the wealth effect on labor supply, and increases the possibility to observe positive consumption response to the shock. Introducing superficial habits have consequences for the labor supply curve since habits will affect the wealth effect on labor supply and the resulting consumption behavior. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) demonstrate that adding habits to the simple RBC model without price stickiness helps in obtaining a positive response of consumption to a government spending shock. Endogenous capital utilization makes it possible for the labor demand to respond endogenously to rising government spending even in the standard RBC setting. Although response of capital utilization to the shock is endogenously determined, it is expected to increase when public spending rises, affecting the demand for labor in a way similar to how price stickiness or. All in all, the presence of these features to some extent may influence the consumption effect of government spending shocks.
Estimation and Inference

Estimation Strategy
The models we study can be cast in linear state space form, with a likelihood derived via a Kalman filter, which when coupled with priors on model parameters delivers posterior means for the parameter vector θ conditional upon the model. In doing so we keep the data employed in the observable equation constant across models. The data y t is the 5 × 1 vector of observable variables defined as follows
where I t , C t , and Y t are real per capita investment, consumption, and output, P Y,t is GDP deflator, therefore ∆(log(P Y,t )) measures inflation rate. Finally, R t is the nominal interest rate, measured by the effective (annualized) Federal funds rate.
12 All the data in vector y t appear in quarterly frequency.
The vector of estimated model parameters is defined as
is the vector of model specific parameters, θ 2 is the vector of parameters common across models, and θ 3 is the vector of parameters calibrating the shock processes. These three groups of parameters consist of the following elements:
Parameters presented in Table 1 are calibrated, either because it is conventional in the literature, or because estimating these parameters is problematic due to identification issues. The parameter governing the steady state share of capital is set at θ = 0.3. Following Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2011), the steady state growth rate of output, µ z * , is calibrated at 1.0047, while the growth rate of the embodied technology is set at 1.0042. Tables 3 and 4 show the prior distribution of the estimated parameters in the five models, in column 2 of the tables. These distributions are chosen from beta, gamma or inverse gamma distributions. All parameters with bounded support have a beta prior distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2. Gamma and inverse gamma distributions are chosen as priors for parameters bounded from below, such as parameters of the nominal rigidities, investment costs, standard deviations of shocks and others. The priors for these parameters are centered at different values, dictated by the common knowledge generated by the empirical literature. The prior distribution for standard deviations of shock processes are modeled as inverse gamma distributions with means 0.1 and standard deviations 1.
Model Comparison
To evaluate the relative quantitative performance of the models, we estimate and compare their marginal likelihoods. Suppose Y T = {y t } T t=1 is the observed history of vector y t up to period T , and Y 0 = Ø. The posterior probability of model A i is determined by Bayes formula
where P (A i ) is the prior probability, and p(Y T |A i ) is the marginal probability of Y T , or the likelihood function. For any two models, A i and A j the posterior odds ratio is defined as
is the ratio of prior probabilities of the two models, called the prior odds ratio,
and
] is the ratio of marginal likelihoods of the two models, or the Bayes factor. Denoting L(i|j) the loss incurred if choosing model A i when model A j is true, the expected posterior loss from choosing model A i is P (A j |Y T )L(i|j). Then, one should choose model A i if the expected posterior loss from choosing it is smaller than that of the alternative model,
. This expression can be rewritten as follows
the right hand side of which is usually called the Bayes critical value. Model A i should be preferred to model A j if the posterior odds ratio exceeds the Bayes critical value. Combining this expression and Equation (10), one can obtain that
If the researcher has prior beliefs about the validity of the two models, and is able to evaluate the relative cost of making a mistake regarding what the true model is, then the posterior odds ratio will provide enough information to choose the model that better explains the data Y T . When there is no strong evidence regarding the prior odds or the Bayes critical value, it is reasonable to set L(i|j) = L(j|i), and P (A i ) = P (A j ). In this case, the model with the larger marginal likelihood should be chosen as the preferred model. Since we do not want to create a bias in favor of any model, we assume all five models have equal prior probabilities, and the same expected posterior losses. We thus compare the models' marginal likelihoods, and leave it to the readers to adjust the reported results about the best fitted model using their prior beliefs.
To calculate the model's marginal likelihood, we implement the Harmonic mean estimator of Gelfand and Dey (1994) , described in detail by Geweke (1999) . Gelfand and Dey notice that for any p.d.f. f (θ) with the support in Θ, the posterior mean of
coincides with the inverse of the marginal likelihood of the model:
, and χ 2 1−p (k) is the p-value of the χ 2 distribution with k degrees of freedom. Geweke (1999) shows that f (θ)
will guarantee the boundedness of expression (11), and thus the posterior mean will exist as long as the posterior density p(θ|Y T , A i ) is uniformly bounded away from zero on every compact subset of Θ.
To calculate the posterior expectation of the expression in (11), we evaluate the mean value of the elements of the Markov chain used to calculate the parameter estimate. As noted in Geweke (1999) , the estimator may sometimes be very unstable. To confirm the stability of our results, we compute the marginal likelihood for different values of p.
Estimation Results
Model Comparison
The results of the model comparison exercise are presented in Table 2 . The first column indicates the value of p used to calculate the marginal likelihood. Column 2 provides the estimate of the log marginal likelihood for the model with deep habits. Columns 3 -6 show marginal likelihood less that of the deep habits model; therefore negative numbers indicate poorer fit of a model. Table 2 reveals that the resulting model marginal likelihood values are very similar for all values of p. The log marginal likelihood of the deep habits model is the largest, and varies around 3854 depending on the value of p. The models with productive government spending, government spending in utility, and the baseline model show very similar log marginal likelihood numbers, which are smaller that that of the deep habit by approximately 13. The model with the poorest fit is that with rule-of-thumb consumers, reporting the log marginal likelihood that is smaller than that in the deep habits model by almost 70. Table 2 clearly identifies the model with deep habits as the one with the best performance at describing the data. The log marginal likelihood of this model exceeds that of the secondbest model (model with government spending in the utility function) by approximately 12, which translates in the Bayes factor of e 12 , much greater than 1000. This is considered decisive in favor of the model with deep habits, according to Jeffreys (1961) . Interestingly, the explanatory power of the baseline model that does not rely on any specific modeling assumptions makes it comparable to two models in the set we study. While the baseline model demonstrates slightly poorer fit than the other two models, with the Bayes factor e 1.3 at largest, the difference between these models is "barely worth mentioning", according to the classification in Jeffreys (1961) . In addition, the results suggest that having the rule-of-thumb consumers does not help improve the fit of the baseline model to the data. Tables 3 and 4 report the estimated parameters in the five models. The estimates are obtained as mean values over 900, 000 out of 1 million elements of the Markov chain generated using the random walk The proposal distribution is multivariate normal with the variance-covariance matrix cΣ, where Σ is determined as the inverse of the numerical Hessian evaluated at the starting element, and c > 0 is a parameter that is adjusted to achieve the acceptance rate in the range between 22 and 40 percent.
Parameter Estimates
13 The observation of the trace and cumulative sum (CUSUM) plots verify that Markov chains are stationary and convergent. Figures 7 -11 show the plots of the estimated posterior distributions together with the priors (black curves). The plots demonstrate that the prior distributions are wide, and that posterior distributions are well defined and different from the priors. Table 3 documents the estimates of model specific parameters and common parameters, besides the shock processes parameters. Although the models have different sets of model specific parameters, consumption habit parameter is present in all the models. However, this parameter has a slightly different meaning across the models because of the unique specifications of the consumption measure X t entering utility.Consumption habit parameters for the deep habits model and the rule-of-thumb model are relatively large (0.92 and 0.73 respectively), which is well within the range reported in the literature. The estimates in models with government spending in utility is very small (b c = 0.05). This may be due to the fact that in this model, the persistent government spending that directly influence utility, generates enough inertia in the dynamics of consumption. Interestingly, Bouakez and Rebei (2007) estimates for the model with government spending in utility are ν and ϕ. The elasticity of substitution between public and private consumption in the model where government spending enters utility, is 0.37, which is close to ν = 0.3 estimated in Bouakez and Rebei (2007) . Parameter ϕ has the posterior mean of 0.67 indicating that private consumption is valued by individuals more than public goods. The mean of the specific parameter in the model with productive government spending, α G , is estimated at 0.11. This value is larger than the one calibrated in the study by Baxter and King (1993) . The rest of Table 3 presents the estimates of the common model parameters. While there is some variation, the parameters are generally consistent across the models. The estimate of the price rigidity parameter α p is in the range of 20 to 40 in all models. With the exception of the rule-of-thumb model, all models demonstrate the wage rigidity parameter above 70. Investment costs parameter varies, but is greater than 4 in all of the models. For all models except the model with government spending in utility, parameter σ turns out to be close to 1, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution close to 1. Parameters of the monetary policy rule in all models imply that the rule is inertial, with α R estimated in the range of 0.7 and 0.8. The response of the policy interest rate to inflation is moderate, with α π varying between 0.25 and 0.5.
14 The estimates imply that the long term response of interest rates to inflation, α π /(1 − α R ), is between 1.2 and 1.9 in all models. The response of the interest rate to output growth, measured by α Y is small and fairly consistent across the models. Table 4 reports the estimates of autocorrelation and standard deviations of the shock processes. The estimates for the government spending, investment specific, and monetary policy shocks are consistent across the models. The autocorrelation for the government spending shock is approximately 0.2 -0.4, and the standard deviation is 0.02 to 0.03 in all models. The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is in the range of 0.002 and 0.003. The autocorrelation of the investment specific shock lies within the range of 0.3 -0.5, and the standard deviation is approximately 0.03. The models provide quite different estimates for the neutral technology and preference processes. However, it is important to understand that neither model can perfectly describe the properties of the data. When an estimated model is missing an internal mechanism to replicate some properties of the data, such as autocorrelations and volatilities, then the estimates of shock processes will be adjusted to replicate observed correlations in the data.
Impulse Responses and Moments
There has been a lot of debate in the literature about the effect of increased government spending on private consumption. The models we investigate in this paper were all developed to introduce a channel to allow consumption to rise in response to an unexpected increase in government spending, which is observed in empirical structural VAR models. The literature has still not come to an agreement on this issue. While some authors report evidence favoring the positive response (see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2007) , Bouakez and Rebei (2007) , Zubairy (2010) ), others fail to find it in their estimated models (see for example Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) , Coenen and Straub (2005) ). We address this debate by comparing responses of consumption to the government spending shock across the estimated models. Figure 3 plots the impulse response of consumption to a 1 percent increase in government spending in the five models, shown as percentage deviations from trend, with quarters along the horizontal axis. The graphs suggest that in three models, those featuring deep habits, rule of thumb, and where government spending enters utility, a positive government spending shock induces a contemporaneous rise in consumption. The response of consumption in the deep habits model is significantly positive but the magnitude of the response is small. However, this is consistent with Zubairy (2010) , who report that the deep habits model underestimates consumption response compared with the data. Consumption responses in the models with rule of thumb consumers and where government spending enters utility are larger at 7 to 10 basis points, which is more in line with empirical studies finding that consumption rises by approximately 0.1 percent in response to a 1 percent government spending shock (see for example Monacelli and Perotti (2008) ).
The baseline model shows that the median response of consumption to the government spending shock is negative, although not significantly different from 0. An important implication of this result is that positive response of consumption is a possibility even in the baseline model, where all model specific features are absent. The model with productive government spending displays similar results. The response of consumption is insignificant, however the median response of consumption to the government spending shock is now positive. Given that parameter estimates for the two models are very similar, the positive median response is clearly due to the fact that the government spending shock enhances productivity and magnifies the rise in the labor demand.
It is possible to relate insignificant consumption response to the fact that the posterior distribution of σ covers both ranges where it is smaller or larger than one. When σ > 1, as is the case in the models with deep habits, rule-of-thumb consumers, and where government spending affects utility, consumption and leisure are substitutes in the sense that U 12 < 0. Therefore, an increase in hours worked h and the corresponding drop in leisure raise marginal utility of consumption, making it more desirable for households to raise consumption. When σ ∈ (0, 1), consumption and leisure are complements, meaning that U 12 > 0, and the opposite is true: a rise in labor brings the marginal utility of consumption down, providing incentives for the households to reduce consumption. It is important to note that in the baseline model, a significant portion (almost 50 percent) of the parameter draws from the posterior distribution justifies a positive response of consumption to the government spending shock. This suggests that an increase in consumption after the shock can be achieved in a conventional DSGE model with non-separable utility, like the baseline model without relying on any of the four mechanisms studied in this paper.
Another observation one can make by comparing consumption responses across the models is that a larger rise in consumption is associated with the larger estimate of σ.
15 On the one hand, larger σ implies smaller intertemporal elasticity of substitution, resulting in more desire to smooth consumption over time. On the other hand, σ determines the degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure (U 12 (1 − h)/U 2 = ζ(1 − σ)). When σ > 1, then the larger σ, the more negative is the labor elasticity of marginal utility in steady state, implying that an increase in hours raises the marginal utility of consumption to a larger extent with a larger σ. As a result, the larger adjustment in consumption should be observed. This can be seen from the log linear approximation to the Euler equation. Ignoring habit formation for simplicity, it can be written as
One can see from this equation, that the larger is σ, the smaller is responsiveness of consumption to changes in the real interest rate (consumption smoothing), and the larger is responsiveness to changes in labor. Consumption responses shown in Figure 3 allow us to conclude that consumption rises in response to the government spending shock in the best fitting model featuring deep habits, and rises in almost all other models we study. However, the magnitude of the consumption response varies significantly across the models, which creates a lot of uncertainty about the quantitative estimates of the consumption effect of government spending shocks. At the same time, we find that the models agree much more about the response of output to the government spending shock. Figure 4 shows output responses to a 1 percent increase in government spending across the five models. The responses are shown in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic trend, with quarters along the horizontal axis. The resulting responses are surprisingly robust across the models, demonstrating that output increases by about 25 basis points after the shock. Given that the steady state share of government spending was fixed at 0.2, this translates into a government spending multiplier of approximately 1.25 in all models.
16 The robustness of output response has an interesting implication: If a researcher is interested in the government spending multiplier of output rather than consumption, it is safe to use any of the models that we analyze in this paper. While it is clear that the best fitting model does not perfectly match the impulse responses obtained with structural VAR models, it is important to understand that the Bayesian estimation procedure we utilize is not intended to produce the closest to the data impulse responses. Bayesian estimation is the full information approach to model estimation, which means that effectively, it is simultaneously trying to match all moments and cross-correlations of the data and the model. To better understand the quality of data fit by the models, we compare moments and autocorrelations predicted by the estimated model and data in Table  5. The table reports Similar to the data, all models report larger volatility of investment and a smaller volatility of consumption relative to output. Comparing model statistics with the data (in the last column), one may notice that although all five models under-predict the relative volatilities of investment, inflation and the interest rate, they match relative volatility of consumption very closely. The only exception is the model with the rule of thumb consumers, for which consumption turns out to be as volatile as output and much more volatile than in the data. The inability to match the volatility of consumption growth may be a factor contributing to the relatively poor fit of the rule-of-thumb model. Note this is explained by the fact in the rule-of-thumb consumer model, the liquidity constrained fraction of the population just consumes its disposable income.
The rest of Table 5 shows the serial correlation and correlation with output growth implied by the models and the data. All models do especially well at matching the persistence in inflation and the interest rate. While all models are able to match the correlation between output growth and consumption and investment growth reasonably well, matching the correlation of the rate of interest with output growth is problematic for all models. The best fitting model featuring deep habits, is notably able to match the negative correlation 16 The multiplier is computed as the response of output divided by the steady state ratio of public spending to output. 24 between inflation and output growth. An explanation might be that in the deep habits model, firms take into account future expected demand relative to current demand when setting prices, and thus the Phillips curve has both current and expected future demand in the expression. Table 6 reports the contribution of the government spending shock to the overall volatility of macroeconomic variables implied by each model. Each column in the table shows model implied standard deviation of a variable when government spending is the only source of uncertainty, relative to the unconditional standard deviation of this variable assuming all sources of uncertainly are present, in percentages. The results show that the government spending shock contributes approximately 20 percent of output volatility in all models, while the contribution to all other variables is smaller. Specifically, the contribution of the government spending shock to consumption is quite small, not exceeding 15 percent, which points to the limited power of government spending shocks in explaining consumption fluctuations. One may also note that this contribution is very different across models, and varies from approximately 1 to almost 13 percent.
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Robustness of the Results: The Role of Preferences
The importance of the utility function in modeling the effects of the government spending shock has been pointed out in several studies. For instance, using non-separable preferences between consumption and leisure, Linnemann (2006) , Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and Bilbiie (2011) demonstrate that higher fiscal spending can lead to an rise in consumption. To allow for the possibility of a rising consumption response to the government spending shock in the baseline model, we adopted the utility function that is nonseparable in consumption and leisure and allowed for the degree of non-separability to be dictated by the data through the estimation procedure. In order to evaluate the contribution of this utility function in generating positive response of consumption in the other four models, we depart from the non-separable form we have used thus far and estimate our four models assuming an additively separable utility function, where U 12 = 0, given by:
where ζ > 0. The resulting impulse responses of consumption and output are shown in Figures 5 and 6 . One can conclude from the figures that while models's predictions regarding the effect of government spending on output do not change much, the consumption effect of the government spending shock are highly sensitive to the choice of the utility function. Specifically, consumption response changes to the opposite in the deep habits model and in the model with productive government spending. Consumption just slightly rises in the model with rule-of-thumb consumers and in the model where government spending enters utility. Tables 2 and 7 reveals that the non-separable utility function used in our baseline model helps improve the fit of the best fitting model, relative to a separable utility function.
Conclusion
In an attempt to explain a positive correlation between private and public consumption observed in structural VAR models, the literature has developed different transmission mechanisms of shocks to government spending into macroeconomic fluctuations. In this paper, we quantitatively explore these mechanisms, by estimating the models with the distinct mechanisms using the same data set and same priors across common parameters, and evaluate the models based on marginal likelihood. We find that among the distinct mechanisms included in this study, the model with deep habits provides the best fit to data. Meanwhile, the model with the poorest fit features rule-of-thumb consumers who exhibit non-Ricardian behavior, and in fact the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers does not help improve the fit of the baseline model to data. We also analyze the various propagation mechanisms at play in the different models under consideration. We show that while all the models we estimate can generate a positive response of consumption to a rise in government spending, the statistical significance and magnitude of that response varies across the models. In addition, we find that non-separable utility in consumption and leisure plays an important role in how consumption responds to spending shocks for the different mechanism studied. In this paper, we compare the different transmission mechanisms based on fitting the data, but do not explore the welfare implication of differing modeling assumption. That is left for future work. Notes. Table shows logarithm of marginal likelihood of a model evaluated using Geweke (1999) procedure. The first column is the parameter p in the Geweke estimator that specifies the supplementary p.d.f f (θ) in Equation (12). The second column shows the marginal likelihood in the model with deep habits. Columns 3-6 present the log of marginal likelihood of a model relative to the best fitted model, so that negative numbers indicate more poor fit. ROT = for rule-of-thumb model, G in U = model with government spending in the utility function, G in F = the model with government spending in the production technology, "Baseline" refers to the baseline model without specific features. Notes. Table shows prior distributions and Bayesian estimates of parameters across different models. Notation in the second columns is as follows: B = beta, G = gamma, I = inverse gamma distributions. Estimates are presented as mean values and standard deviations across the last 900, 000 out of 1 million elements of a Markov chain generated using the Metropolis Hastings algorithm. Kalman filter is used to evaluate the likelihood of the data. Notes. Table shows logarithm of marginal likelihood of a model evaluated using Geweke (1999) procedure. The first column is the parameter p in the Geweke estimator that specifies the supplementary p.d.f f (θ) in Equation (12). The second column shows the marginal likelihood in the model with deep habits. Columns 3-5 present the log of marginal likelihood of a model relative to the best fitted model, so that negative numbers indicate more poor fit. ROT = for rule-of-thumb model, G in U = model with government spending in the utility function, G in F = the model with government spending in the production technology. 
Tables and Figures
Symmetric Equilibrium in Stationary Variables
Stationary transformations of model variables are presented in 
For the steady state to exist, the following two relationships must hold between the growth rates of shocks and model variables: 
where mc t is the stationary marginal costs of firms. Given the assumed functional form for δ(u t ) in Equation (??), the optimal choice of capital services supplied by households implies
The dynamics of capital in stationary variables is
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The costs of capital, price and wage adjustments can be written in stationary variables as: The optimal choice of capital is driven by the following F.O.C.: 
where µ is the lagrange multiplier for the constraint on labor demand in the optimal choice of the wage rate by households. The optimal choice of state-contingent securities by optimizing households implies
The monetary policy rule in terms of stationary variables is
The aggregate market clearing condition in the market for goods is
Model with Deep Habits: Equilibrium
Effective stationarized consumption entering utility in Formula (13) in the deep habits model is Notes: Each graph shows the impact response of consumption to a 1% government spending shock on the y-axis. On the x-axis the parameter of interest is varied, while all other parameters are kept at their estimated median value.The vertical dashed line corresponds to the estimated value of the parameter. Notes: Each graph shows the impact response of consumption to a 1% government spending shock on the y-axis. On the x-axis the parameter of interest is varied, while all other parameters are kept at their estimated median value.The vertical dashed line corresponds to the estimated value of the parameter. Notes: Each graph shows the impact response of consumption to a 1% government spending shock on the y-axis. On the x-axis the parameter of interest is varied, while all other parameters are kept at their estimated median value.The vertical dashed line corresponds to the estimated value of the parameter.
